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LITERACY AND THE WORTH OF LIBERTY
Edward Stevens(+)
Abstract : As one example of the third generation of lit-
eracy studies, this paper investigates the functional
value of literacy in legal transactions . Based upon empir-
ical evidence about mortgages and wills in two American
counties in the 19th century, the article investigates the
general legal theory and court practice regarding the
participation of illiterate persons in contracts . In spite
of a lingering fairness doctrine, illiterates were more
and more disadvantaged in legal dealings.
During the past fifteen years, the compilation and analysis of quantitative
data about the level and distribution of literacy skills in selected popula-
tions has allowed historians to describe and conceptualize the linkages
among literacy, social structure, wealth, and demographic characteristics.
The results have been fruitful in terms of quantifying the structural rela-
tionships among literacy and the several variables of occupation, wealth,
ethnicity, nativity, sex, age, population density, indices of economic and
social development, and schooling . They have offered, also, insights into
the conceptual difficulties posed by literacy studies, including problems of
definition, comparability of data, and direction of causation.(1) Some
crucial literacy-associated issues, however, have gone relatively unexa-
mined . Among these, for example, are the related problems of functionality,
opportunity, and the effects of illiteracy on the liberties of illiterate
persons.
We know little about functional levels of literacy skills as they relate to
the performance of specified tasks, ranging from occupational requirements,
to political participation, and the conduct of legal proceedings . Findings
on the relationship of literacy to individual wealth and economic mobility
are inconsistent . Though literacy operated as a significant influence on
occupational classifications, according to Graff its impact on wages was far
less : With the exception of the lowest paid, . . . literate workmen fared
little better than their illiterate colleagues ."(2) But my own recent work
argues on the basis of nineteenth-century United States census data that
literacy was an important determinant of economic advancement during the
individual's life cycle. . . . " Though approximately 40 % of the illiterate
male population in 1870 could still obtain a "fair beginning standard of
living," these illiterates were concentrated among young adults. Among those
aged 40-49 it was much more difficult for the illiterate to rise above the
median wealth Iine .(3) Other studies on literacy in nineteenth-century
England suggest that the demand for literate workers was rising in the
latter part of the century and created a "positive expected premium " for
literate workers .(4) While the inconsistency in findings for the mobility-
literacy relationship derives in part from the differing contexts of the
data, it may also suggest that the simple literacy/illiteracy dichotomy is
too crude a measure and that finer distinctions among levels of literacy
may be necessary.
(+) Address all communications to : Edward Stevens, School of Curriculum and
Instruction, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701 USA .
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Questions of justice and the worth of liberty are also closely tied to the
issue of functionality
. At one level, this concerns distributive justice,
because resources are limited and rules for their fair distribution need to
be established
. The case of the relationship between fair educational oppor-
tunity and economic opportunity is well known . The infrastructure of the
distribution of benefits of schooling and the opportunity to acquire litera-
cy skills may be an important factor in determining the fairness of the
distribution of economic resources
. Similar problems occur with the distri-
bution of other benefits
. It is obvious that if literacy skills are required
to exercise voting rights, for example, the worth of liberty for the illi-
terate person is severely diminished.
The adoption of the secret ballot in the state of Ohio in 1891 led to
several cases in which courts were required to face the issue of educational
and literacy qualifications for voting. State ex rel . Weinberger v . Miller
(1912) provided the basic argument for the constitutionality of Ohio sta-
tutes governing the secret ballot . In delivering its opinion the Court cited
a precedent that identical ballots give equal protection to all and that
inequalities inhere not in the law but in voters themselves
. In State
v
. Sweeney (1950) the Court argued for "equal opportunities under the law,"
but added : "lt is not possible for constitutions or legislation to make all
men equal in understanding, intelligence and education 	 " State legisla-
tion tended in the direction of equality of education even to the point of
"compelling the youth of our country to take advantage of these opportuni-
ties." But the Court acknowledged that "in every phase of our social and
civic life the uneducated man is at a disadvantage
." In commenting upon the
use of a printed ballot, the Court concluded that the state was "powerless"
to give the uneducated voter "further aid":
Just so long as we are to have elections by written or printed
ballot, just so long must be uneducated man find it a difficult
matter to vote for the candidate of his choice .(5)
The casting of the ballot is but one example of the way in which injustice
at the individual level results from legal principles which put the illit-
erate person at a disadvantage . Others readily come to mind and involve a
broad spectrum of basic economic activities such as willing, deeding, and
other two party or third, party contracts . To convey one's meaning and intent
to another party was and is seen as critical in making a contract success-
ful . The ideal of contract, having achieved suitable recognition in law and
in political theory in the seventeenth century, became pervasive in the
eighteenth century in governing agreements among men
. By the 19th century it
was difficult to think of agreements in any other terms so that contracts
became deeply embedded in American society. How did this contractual ideal
and the practice of contractual agreements affect the illiterate person?
Consent and Publicity in a Documentary Society
The proliferation and gradual standardization of documents in Anglo-American
culture substantially changed the nature of governance and the rules of
proof and evidence regulating property holding and contractual agreements.
After the imposition of Norman rule in England the written word itself
gradually became associated with reliability and durability . The idea of
permanence became associated with written documents and, insofar as docu-
ments themselves were employed to convey rights or interests in property,
they helped to protect these . Nonetheless, a gap between a person's intent
and the meaning expressed in a written instrument did persist and, in this
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sense, some ambiguity has remained characteristic of the written word as it
has of the oral .(6)
The emergence of a documentary society and the broadening of literate
discourse to include imaginative, technical, and scientific communication
raised important issues about the relationships among literacy, opportunity,
and justice . The linkages among these fundamental aspects of associated
living, however, are not easily expressed and cumbersome to explicate.
Philosophic questions of distributive and individual justice are compounded
by the lack of empirical (qualitative and quantitative) evidence which would
help describe and explain the degree of relationship(s). The meanings of
literacy and its consequences for individual behavior and social organiza-
tion have depended upon certain situational factors and structural con-
straints. Constitutionalism as a political and organizational ideal, for
example, relies upon a contractual theory of governance and the principles
of consent and publicity . Justice requires the opportunity and skills to
access information needed to give consent and to enter into contract.
The problems deriving from the principle of free and rational consent occur
with greater force when dealing with illiterate persons. Contract and cove-
nant theories of government, whether inspired by natural law theory or a
more general ideal of fairness, assume that those subject to political and
legal constraints act as free, rational persons and willingly accept the
demands and constraints placed on them . As a result they are morally obli-
gated to control their behaviors in accordance with the constraints . Both
obligations and expectations, however, are often second hand for the illiter-
ate person . Obligation and rational, free consent imply capacity, ability
and capability . It is the latter which is uncertain for the illiterate.
Although there is little doubt that an illiterate person is capable of
giving his consent, if by that terni is meant the saying of "yes", there is
considerable question that the "yes" would correlate well with the substance
or text of the agreement.
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls cites the principle of "publicity " , a
condition whereby general principles of justice and governance are made
explicit, as being essential for a society where the contractarian ideal
prevails. Access to information is obviously limited for the illiterate
person, so that even if "publicity" prevails, illiteracy makes it inopera-
tive . To put it differently, the condition of illiteracy severely limits the
opportunities for consent even when the principle of publicity is otherwise
fulfilled by the free circulation of political and legal information . It is
the intent of publicity to guarantee that common expectations will be recog-
nized, and that all will know what limitations are placed on their behaviors
and what to expect from each other . The guarantee, however, does not apply
to the illiterate . The anticipation of legitimate expectations creates
problems for the illiterate person in a documentary and contractual society.
As a result there is an important distinction between the existence and the
worth of liberty . While liberty in general refers to the "complete system of
the liberties of equal citizenship, . . . the worth of liberty to persons and
groups is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the
framework the system defines ."(7)
Participation of Illiterates in Legal Transactions
Depositions, wills, deeds, mortgages, and other types of contracts comprised
the bulk of documents with which both literate and illiterate persons were
involved . To treat in detail the degree of illiterate involvement over an
extended chronological period is not the purpose of this essay . It is only
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necessary to establish a baseline for the involvement of illiterate persons
with the legal system before assessing the difficulties and restrictions to
which illiterates were subject . Charts s and 2 show levels of participation
in the basic activities of deeding and mortgaging for two counties in the
states of Ohio and Delaware over the 120 year period between 178o and
1900 .(8)
Illiteracy rates among testators varied considerably over the years 1780-
1900 and ranged from 8 to 41 percent . The average in Kent County, Delaware
during these years was 13 .4 percent ; in Washington, Ohio illiteracy among
testators was much higher and averaged 21 percent . Among witnesses to wills,
illiteracy seldom rose above so percent and by the end of the century had
dropped to zero . The low rate of illiteracy among witnesses to wills may
have helped to reduce the amount of error and misinterpretation in this
important method of disposing of property . For the entire period under
analysis, 12 .5 percent of the grantors and 9 .7 percent of the mortgagors
were illiterate in Kent County . In Washington County an average of so per-
cent of the grantors and 11 .4 percent of the mortgagors were illiterate.
The average value of land conveyances and degree of indebtedness among
markers was far below that for those signing their names . This does not mean
that investments by illiterate persons were less significant from a personal
standpoint . We do not know the income of the literate and illiterate persons
represented in the sample, but it might well have been that a greater
sacrifice was required of illiterates to participate in deeding and
mortgaging than for literates.
When values of deed transactions are cross-classified by literacy, the
degree to which the average value of transactions among literates exceeds
that among illiterates is expressed by their ratio (Avg . Value LI/Avg . Value
ILL). In all years sampled literate persons had higher transaction levels
with the ratios ranging from 1 .2 to 3 .4 and averaging 2 .3 Thus, as a general
guideline, the value of deed transactions among literates was about two and
one-half times greater than among illiterates . The findings for literate and
illiterate grantors are applicable to mortgagors as well . In all years
sampled, the degree of indebtedness among literate persons exceeded that
among illiterates, with the ratio varying between 1 .3 and 3 .0 (and an
average of 1 .9 in Kent County and 1 .7 in Washington County) . The degree of
indebtedness among literate persons, then, was generally about twice as
great as among illiterate ones.
Many illiterates were dependent upon literates to interpret written docu-
ments and give advice about their accuracy and intent . Such assistance was
probably readily available if the illiterate transactor were a co-conveyer
or co-mortgagor with a literate person . When the illiterate person was the
sole participant or one of several illiterates to a transaction, then out-
side help was probably required . With what frequency did illiterate persons
find themselves in situations where they had to seek advice from a literate
person not involved with their transactions? Or conversely, to what extent
were the problems of illiteracy minimized because the illiterate person was
a co-participant in a transaction with a literate person?
Many illiterate transactors had literate partners to a deed or mortgage
agreement . These cases ranged from 8 to 10 percent of the total separate
transactions and usually involved husbands and wives . Most often the husband
was literate and the wife illiterate, although this was true more so in the
first half of the nineteenth century than in the second half . It may be
presumed that questions of intent and accuracy could be clarified to some
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Table 1 .1 The Dependency of Illiterate Grantors and Mortgagors in Kent
and Washington Counties, 1780-1900
County and The Percent of Deed
Transactions withYear
Two or More
Illiterates
but no
Literates
Single
Illiterates
Literates
and
Illiterates
Kent
	
(1780-1900) 4 3 8
Washington
	
(1790-1900) 2 2 8
The Percent of Mortgage
 Transactions with
Two or More
Illiterates
	
Literates
Single
	
but no
	
and
Illiterates
	
Literates
	
Illiterates
Kent (1860-1900)
	
1
	
3
	
8
Washington (1840-1900)
	
2
	
4
	
10
Source : Subsamples of 844 and 1924 separate deed transactions from Kent
County, Delaware and Washington County, Ohio and 463 and 701
mortgage transactions from the same counties, respectively.
Repeated names have been omitted.
extent by the literate party . This would have been more convenient than
seeking outside assistance, even though it was no guarantee of protection
against duplicity. The success of such help would depend upon the level of
' literacy and the familiarity of the literate party with the proper forms of
deeds and mortgages.
Agreements involving only illiterates were the most precarious
. Overall,
between 4 and 7 percent of the deeds and mortgages in the sample were made
by grantors and mortgagors all of whom were illiterate
. For those illiterate
persons who had no literate partners to a transaction, the problem was
surely more acute than for those with literate partners
. The only sources of
help for the former would be from an outside literate party - a neighbor
perhaps or relative, or a lawyer
. It is probable that the hiring of a lawyer
by an illiterate was more difficult than for a literate person, for the
majority of illiterate persons were to be found at the lower end of the
wealth distribution .(9)
The Contractual Ideal
The frequent participation of illiterates in economic and legal activities
involving lexical skills raises important questions about the relationship
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between contract as a political, social, and legal construct and justice for
both the illiterate and literate person . Problems of intent, consent, will,
and reason were philosophic, legal, and behavioral all at once, and courts
were obliged to wrestle with all three dimensions simultaneously . How could
justice be achieved for both illiterate and literate persons? Clearly,
illiteracy was not simply a problem for the illiterate person, for his/her
contractual dealings affected numerous literate parties to a contract. Thus,
the response of the legal system to the fact of illiteracy was significant
for all 'parties involved.
The natural law tradition carried forward into the nineteenth century under
the protection of constitutional jurisprudence provided a link between
theories of social contract and the protection of private property by legal
rules governing contractual relations of a more formal sort.(10) Natural
law, the idea of social compact, and English experience were all brought to
the defense of private property against legislative intrusion, and the
inviolability of contract was expressly recognized by the United States
Constitution .(11) Economic due process and freedom of contract have been
hallowed principles guarded by the American constitution . Historically, due
process of law as applied to contract has been taken to mean that a person's
right to property cannot be abridged nor the property itself taken for the
benefit of another without compensation .(12)
While contractual relations seemed necessary to good moral and social order
and economic stability, the expressed link between property rights and
social stability was found in a number of court decisions . Freedom of con-
tract, a frequently heard phrase in disputes, was interpreted as a means to
the goals of political and economic freedom in general . Self interest and
social stability were not seen as antagonistic, but rather as mutually
reinforcing elements in a contractually-based society . The idea of contract
thus served the interests of both individual and society . "Solemn con-
tracts", said the Court in Robinson v . Eldrigde (1823) were not to be set
aside lightly for fear that grave social consequences would follow .(13)
The high regard for the inviolability of contractual relations was, of
course, part of the deference paid to property in general . A series of cases
decided by federal courts beginning with Dartmouth College v . Woodward (1819)
had helped "to secure property interests, and to protect ownership and
management rights from shifting, temporary winds of public opinion ." Refor-
med recording practices and the appearance of a simple, standardized deed
(warranty and quit-claim) forms also helped to assure that rights in proper-
ty were secure . Under circumstances where land was a commodity in a mass
market, old English common law forms for conveyancing were obstructionist.
Moreover, land transactions were increasingly treated as contracts, as
Friedman notes, and "were subjected to many general doctrines of contract
law ." Land law, as with other parts of the law, was "greedily swallowed up "
by contract .(14)
The increasing use of the executory contract and the emergence of a "will"
theory of contract were accompanied by the demise of principles of equity as
applied to contractual relations . The theory of equitable limitations on
contractual obligation prevalent in the 18th century had as its purpose the
assurance that a fair exchange had taken place . In the nineteenth century it
was superceded by a will theory of contract which judged contractual obliga-
tion by the "convergence of individual desires ."(15) The emergence of a free
market model for contract which stressed the assent of contracting parties
did not vanquish all notions of fairness in contractual relations . But the
banishment of an objective theory of value from the realms of theory did not
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necessarily mean that courts were unsympathetic to fair dealings in indivi-
dual cases
. Friedman has remarked of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that in the matter of fraud, mistake, and misrepresentation courts
followed tendencies not rules. Throughout the nineteenth century courts were
willing, as the situation warranted, to return to an eighteenth-century
paternalistic mode to protect the weak and ignorant when their cases reached
adjudication.
The market model highlighted the unencumbered will of the contracting indi-
vidual, his ability to negotiate for his own benefit, and his responsibility
to abide by the words (expressing his intent) of the contract . These fea-
tures, in conjunction with the propensity of courts to formalism and lite-
ralness in judging intent ("the words speak for themselves") helped to give
contractual relations the impersonal quality of the free market itself.
Offer, acceptance, and consideration were the manifestations of intent.
Consideration was evidence of a price freely fixed, of a willing seller and
a willing buyer
.(16) The doctrine of caveat emptor became increasingly
powerful .(17)
In contractual matters many of the problems of intent are evidentiary in
nature . Thus, the commission of fraud or misrepresentation is a matter of
ascertaining what evidence ought to prevail in a particular context or with
a particular document . Contracts are both a "meeting of the minds" and
agreements representing self interest in the desire to get the best of a
bargain . The application of the principle of "literalism" was often the only
way to determine the intent of parties to a contract . Both the common sense
meaning of a disputed instrument and its structure were thus guides to the
intent of the parties
. It was but a short step to saying that written
expression was not simply symbolic of intent, but, in fact, was the intent
itself of parties to a contract
. Thus a will theory of contract was able to
transform and disembody intent in the abstraction of written expression.
Here it could be confirmed by signature or mark and judged by the principle
of literalness.
In interpreting the meaning of contracts, courts searched for a meeting of
the minds, which itself was presumed to be an objective reality capable of
identification. Given the limits of probing the intent of parties to a con-
tract, however, reality ususally turned out to be the document itself and
the "plain meaning of the words
." Where an expressed agreement existed,
where stipulations to a transaction were stated, implied agreements running
contrary to or substantially modifying these were not recognized . As was the
case with land law and the law of negotiable instruments, contract law thus
came to put its faith in the written word above all else .(i8) A written
contract was to conform to the intent of the parties, of course, but when it
did not, the rules of law and language prevailed in its construction.
Contracts and Illiteracy
Contracts with illiterate parties were particularly troublesome . Illiterate
persons were not, by virtue of their illiteracy, incompetent in the legal
sense as were lunatics, idiots and drunkards . Nonetheless, mutual consent
and an intelligent understanding of contractual terms were required of them
if a valid contract were to exist . To determine whether such consent and
understanding were present was not an easy task, especially when the fairness
of the contract was in question.
Illiterates faced a wide range of difficulties when dealing with written
instruments . Courts of law and equity were aware of these and often used
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guidelines that had been developed centuries before . Thus the famous seven-
teenth case of Thoroughgood was the basis for a number of judgments involving
illiterate parties to a contract:
. .
. held, 1st, that a deed executed by an illiterate person does
not bind him, if read falsely either by the grantee or a stranger;
2ndly, that an illiterate man need not execute a deed before it be
read to him in a language which he understands ; but if the party
executes without desiring it to be read, the deed is binding;
3rdly, that if an illiterate man executes a deed which is falsely
read, or the sense declared differently from the truth, it does
not bind him ; and that though it be a friend of his, unless there
be covin .(19)
The British case of Carlisle and Cumberland Co . v . Bragg (1910), used the
familiar analogy of blindness to define the problems of the illiterate . In
one of the separate opinions to the case, Justice Buckley explained : "l know
of only three ways in which a person can be informed of the contents of a
document . It may be by the eye, or by the ear, or, in the case of blind man,
it may be by touch, as under Braille's system . In this last case touch may
be treated as equivalent to sight."(20) As important was the situation in
which a party to a contract is dealing with an unfamiliar language . When the
marks on a page convey no meaning because they cannot be understood (as in a
foreign language) the equivalent of illiteracy is present . "It seems to me,"
said the Justice, that the same doctrine applies to every person who is so
placed as that he is incapable by the use of such means as are open to him
of ascertaining, or is by false information deceived in a material respect
as to, the contents of the document which he is asked to sign . "(21)
Courts assumed that an illiterate person was, unless demonstrated otherwise,
both competent and intelligent enough to enter into contractual obligations.
This was true throughout a wide range of cases . The Court in Nathaniel
Atwood v . James Cobb (1934) noted that when illiterate persons enter into
contracts " . . . the intent of the parties . . . ascertained, is to be the
governing rule for carrying the contract into effect ." Willard v . Pinard
(1892) noted that the "parties sustained to each other the ordinary relation
existing between an educated, honest, businessman and an ordinary bright and
capable man, possessed of memory and judgment, but uneducated in knowledge
of books, and the art of reading and writing, except to a limited ex-
tent ."(22)
In making assumptions about literacy, competency and intelligence courts
were helping to buttress a defense against what they perceived to be a
threat to the stability of the written contract . Since the written contract
itself had helped to achieve stability in contractual agreements, it was a
matter of the highest priority to protect the integrity of written instru-
ments . A written contract, said Justice Sanborn in 1897 is the highest
evidence of the ternis of an agreement between the parties to it . . . ." The
contracting party "owes it to the public, which as a matter of public
policy, treats the written contract as a conclusive answer to the question,
what was the agreement?(23) To allow avoidance of contractual obligations by
the plea that the contract had not been read nor understood, or to deny that
a written contract expressed an agreement made would be to destroy the
foundation of stable business and commercial dealings.
The obligation to read or to have read a contract to which one is a party
was explained by Blackstone and compiled in the Commentaries . Most American
judges of the early nineteenth century probably began with this formulation
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as their reference when faced with the problems of illiteracy and the under-
standing of contracts. For the literate person, the issue was quite
straight-forward . If the party to a contract had it within his power to
understand the terms, but "reposed a blind confidence in representation not
calculated to deceive a man of ordinary prudence and circumspection" then
the "law affords no relief ."(24)
For an illiterate person the issue of his understanding of a contract was
considerably more complicated . Since verification of claims of ignorance
without negligence is subjective, . courts often operated in a gray area of
evidence . Several nineteenth century cases (Seldon v . Myers (1857), Suffern
and Galloway v . Butler and Butler (1867), Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v . Shay
(1876), Green v . Maloney (1884), Chicago St. P ., M. and O. Ry . Co. v.
Belliwith (1897), and Bates v . Harte (1899) illustrate this point well .(25)
The sanie difficulty was evident in cases of a third party for surety on a
note . In Craig v . Hobbs (1873), for example, a note bearing the signature of
the illiterate Hobbs, but actually signed for him by one Grissom, was held
to be valid under the circumstances . The Court concluded that Hobbs had
placed his confidence, "blind confidence" though it might have been, in
Grissom and that the act of Grissom in signing it was the act of Hobbs, so
far as the act of affixing the signature is concerned ."(26)
Seldon v . Myers was heard by the U .S. Supreme Court with Chief Justice Taney
presiding . In filling a bill to obtain an injunction staying the sale of his
property, Seldon claimed that when he had executed the note and deed, he
could neither read nor write and "did not know that the whole of said
property was included, and was under the impression that it conveyed onlya
portion of it ." In delivering the opinion, Taney noted that Myers and Compa-
ny were under the obligation
to show, past doubt, that he [Seldon] fully understood the object
and import of the writing upon which they are proceeding to charge
him ; and if they had failed to do so, the above-mentioned testimo-
ny offered by the apellant, as to the state of the accounts bet-
ween them at the time, would have furnished strong grounds for
inferring that he had been deceived, and hat not understood the
meaning of the written instruments he signed .(27)
Clearly it was incumbent upon the literate party to make certain that the
illiterate person understood the terms of the agreement . Testimony offered
by a witness present at the negotiations supported Myers and Company, how-
ever, and could not be refuted by other witnesses called in Seldon's behalf.
The Court had little faith in the "recollections " of other witnesses or in
Seldon's memory . Typically, and in contrast to the assumption of the illiter-
ate person's well-developed memory In the Matter of Cross (1895), the Court
noted that Seldon's inability to read and keep accounts would most likely
result in a "confused recollection of these conversations and might, without
any evil intention, confound what had been said in relation to dealings
subsequent to the note with conversations which passed in the time it was
executed."(28)
In dealing with illiterate parties to a contract, courts generally required
a fair reading of the written instrument . This would normally be a complete
reading, but, at the least, it would include all the critical parts of the
agreement . Reading the written instrument correctly was as material to its
validity as was signing the agrrement.(29) If an illiterate party did not
demand a reading of the written instrument, he was sulky of negligence.
Neither law nor equity protected the negligent person.(30) The obligation to
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locate a reliable person to read and explain a contract was one which lay
with the illiterate party . By the late nineteenth century this principle
became noticeably more forceful in decisions of the courts . Paroi evidence
was not admissable to invalidate a written contract, and, regardless of what
an oral agreement might have been, the written contract was sacred unless
fraud was perpetrated on one of the parties.
A similar attempt to protect the written contract is evident in the prin-
ciple of negligence . Courts wished to avoid the use of negligent ignorance
as an excuse to invalidate a contract . It was unnecessary to prove that an
illiterate party actually understood the contract before signing or marking.
Understanding was presumed in Green v . Maloney (1884).
It is of course not necessary, in such cases of reading or expla-
nation, to show that the illiterate did understand its contents
and their nature ; if, after a paper has been read or explained to
him, he sign it, making no objection to it, nor request any expla-
nation of it, he must, in all reason, be taken to have known what
he was signing . And, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a
paper read to a party and which he signed, is to be presumed to
have been understood by him, and he will not be allowed of aver
against it, unless he can show to the satisfaction of a court and
jury that the paper was falsely and fraudently read or explained,
with intent to deceive and obtain the advantage of him .(31)
Both the paroi evidence rule and the principle of negligent ignorance showed
no diminution in twentieth-century cases. if anything, courts tended to
state them with greater confidence and with explicit recognition that their
observance was crucial to sound commercial dealings .(32)
The principle of negligent ignorance was easily applied when no question of
fraud existed. When, however, fraud or misrepresentation were thought to be
a possibility, the issue was not so simple . The presumption of fraud was not
easily made and its presence usually had to be clearly established by proof.
Despite the fact that this principle was elementary, it is interesting that
courts found it necessary to reiterate it frequently . While fraud in a
written instrument might be more observable than in an oral agreement, the
difficulty was often the sanie, because oral interpretations were so crucial
to the illiterate person
.(33)
The case of Walker v . Ebert (1871) delineated the issue of fraud in ternis of
a will theory of contract. When a contract is falsely read to an illiterate
person, the mind of the signer (does) not accompany the signature," said
the court-134) The defendant in Walker v . Ebert was a German by birth,
unable to read or write the English language . Ebert had entered into an
agreement to be the sole agent for a "certain patented machine" and was to
receive a percent of all the profits on his sales . He had signed what he
thought to be a contract, orally agreed upon, but the instrument bearing his
signature was, in fact, a promissory note . The action before the Court was
on a promissory note by the holder, who claimed to have purchased it for
full value, before maturity . A lower court had ruled that the testimony by
the defendant was not admissable and the defendant had challenged this
decision . In ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, the Court applied a
basic rule of intent governing the validity of an illiterate's mark to a
contract.
It seems plain on principle and on authority, that if a blind man,
or a man who cannot read, or for some reason (not implying neg-
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ligence), forebears to read, has a written contract falsely read
over to him, the reader misreading to such a degree that the
written contract is of a nature altogether different from the
contract pretended to be read from the paper, which the blind or
illiterate man afterwards signs, then, at least, if there be no
negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force ; and it is
invalid, not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists,
but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany
the signature ; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and
therefore, in contemplation of law, never did sign the contract to
which his name is appended.
The signature was, therefore, no better than a "total forgery," and the
defendant clearly had not intended "to endorse a bill of exchange
." This was
fraud in the factum, a trick or artifice having been perpetrated on the
illiterate victim . Obviously no meeting of the minds had taken place in a
general sense, although the immediate issue was one of a deliberate misre-
presentation . Ebert, the Court concluded, was deceived both as to the "legal
effect" of the instrument and its "actual contents
."(35)
Since issues of consent, negligence, and fraud were closely related, their
resolution was always determined within a particular context . The point was
well made in National Exchange Bank v . Veneman (1887), a case heard in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York . An illiterate German farmer signed
what he believed to be a contract but which turned out to be a promissory
note . Negligence was one of the issues to be resolved by the Court
. Since
Veneman could not read the instrument and feared it might be a promissory
note, he had asked the agent negotiating the supposed contract for assuran-
ces that it was nothing but a contract
. Veneman had also asked his wife to
read the instrument, but she informed him that she was unable to read it,
and did not understand its meaning." There was, however, a boy tending the
horse nearby . As it turned out, the boy was literate, but had not been asked
to read the instrument
. Thus, although it was clear that the agent had
perpetrated a fraud, the issue of negligence still arose
.(36).
In delivering its opinion, the Court focussed on the context of the negotia-
tion
. "It cannot be said," the Court observed, that it was negligence per
se not to seek his neighbors and learn from them the contents of the wri-
ting ." Noting that the content of the instrument was not particularly com -
plicated and could be easily expressed by a literate person, the Court
reminded the parties that " the nature and character of the paper intended to
be executed must always be considered in determining the question of the
defendent's negligence, so far as it is based on the omission to inquire of
others for the purpose of ascertaining from them the contents of the wri-
ting ." Ultimately the Court concluded that "the question of negligence is
not always one of law and often becomes a question of fact for the consider-
tation of a jury ."(37)
The determination of fraud was a highly subjective matter and depended in
each case upon the " relative situation of the parties and their means of
information
." Where misrepresentation was obvious and a party to a contract
accepted the ternis, "with his eyes open[,] he has no right to complain ."
Likewise, when the " parties have equal means of information, the rule of
caveat emptor applies. . . ." When a false representation was a "mere expres-
sion of commendation, or is simply a matter of opinion, the parties stand
upon equal footing, and the courts will not interfere to correct errors of
judgement . "(38) Knowing that fear might lead to cynicism and a degree of
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caution that would make contractual activity extremely difficult, the Court
gave the following practical advice to those engaged in business transac-
tions:
The law does not require a prudent man to deal with everyone as a
rascal and demand covenants to guard against the falsehood of
every representation which may be made as to facts which consti-
tute material inducements to a contract . There must be a reason
able reliance upon the integrity of men or the transactions of
business, trade and commerce could not be conducted with the
facility and confidence which are essential to successful enter
prise and the advancement of individual and national wealth and
prosperity
.(39)
Legal Disadvantages of Illiteracy
The high priority placed upon the written word fundamentally altered the way
men thought about proof and evidence as these applied to the many arrange-
ments broadly construed as contract . Assumptions made about freedom, intent
and assent in contractual relations were reinterpreted in light of a new
literalism in the way business was transacted . Other things being equal
(which they usually were not), the illiterate person was increasingly put at
a disadvantage in conducting business, though principles of natural justice
(equity) and a fairness doctrine functioned to mitigate the adverse effects
of literalism for the unlettered person.
As offer, acceptance, and consideration carne to be the validating criteria
for contract, the tension between literalism and fairness became greater.
Some of this may be attributed to technical difficulties in assessing a
person's intent in a contractual arrangement, but a more basic difficulty
resulted from differing estimates of the degree to which persons were free
and rational in their behavior . Self-reliance was the cornerstone of utili-
tarian atomism in which the individual negotiated and assented to contrac-
tual arrangements in his own best interest . The written accord was taken to
be the final expression of the individual's will, purpose, or intent . From
this, there could be no appeal, barring fraud or misrepresentation . But
there was also the question of fairness, of equity . Literalness in contract
could be powerfully instrumental in confirming an unfair bargain, and, in
the case of the illiterate person, the questions of accuracy in interpreta-
tion and expectations had to be raised. How free and self-reliant couldthe
illiterate person be? Time and again, judgments had to be made upon a
subjective consideration of this question.
The extenuating circumstance of illiteracy in a contractual agreement did
not alter the general postulate that obligations had to be net and contracts
fulfilled . Natural law theory, with its roots in Christian axiology, had
long taught the moral obligation to perform a promise . Obligation to per-
form, too, had a utilitarian justification in the good order and welfare of
society . Arguments for both moral order and social order were often brought
to the defense of contract. Just as readily, however, contract could be
defended in terms of flexibility . In the United States in the nineteenth
century, economic growth and opportunities for profit easily justified
business arrangements that would maximize mobility, freedom of decision, and
economic self-improvement . Negotiation of a contract was often perceived as
a process of attempting to win the race for pecuniary gain, the obstruction
of which seemed contrary to the Protestant ethic itself .
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Though it certainly implied a lack of education, illiteracy did not, in the
eyes of the courts, usually imply a lack of intelligence or competence . Thus
it was the presumption of courts that, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, illiterate persons ought to have the sanie responsibility and
freedom in contracts as literate persons
. The right to contract had been
buttressed by constitutional decisions
. Assumptions about the free will of
the indivual and the natural law tradition, though they proceeded from
different premises, both asserted the obligation to honor contracts . None of
them could, however, resolve the problem of fairness . Mutual understanding
was an essential element in the contractual ideal
. In practice, form might
overrule suppositions about mutual understanding, but it would not eliminate
that understanding as an essential part of the contractual ideal . Nor could
proper form eliminate considerations of fairness.
As a general rule it was to be presumed that a free, intelligent person
would act in his/her own best interest
. When grossly unfair bargains were
made, therefore, it seemed appropriate to search for a cause
. In the case of
the illiterate person, that reason was readily apparent
. Knowing that fraud,
deception and misrepresentation were more easily practiced on the illiterate
person, a doctrine of fairness made good sense in gauging the adequacy or
inadequacy of price
. The signing of a contract still implied understanding
and assent, and negligence was not an excuse for invalidating a contract.
Yet, in the name of equitable dealing for illiterates, courts were compelled
to strike a balance between formal literalism on the one hand and fairness
on the other
. The balance was not always precise as economic expansion and
concerns with individual justice competed for the attention of the courts
and the loyalty of judges.
Fairness and legitimacy became complementary guidelines for conduct
. Yet
this perception has differed radically depending upon the accessability of
information
. This, of course, was and is the illiterate person's major
problem, and it was the relative scarcity of information for the illiterate
that affected decisions about promising, obligation, testimony, or the
exercise of voting privileges, for example . At both the individual and
general levels, it resulted in differing expectations and different percep-
tions of fairness, thereby affecting the degree of liberty under law avail-
able to the illiterate person. Varying levels of dependency and understan-
ding on the part of the illiterate person may be found and this is true for
the literate person, as well . Still, the fundamental difficulty persisted
namely that liberties under law were and are circumscribed by the absence or
misinterpretation of relevant information
. Preserving the integrity of con-
tracts was the first priority of the courts, and the measure of justice for
the parties involved was generally the degree to which the intent of the
parties was fulfilled
. Where the written agreement represented that intent,
or, as sometimes happened, was linked with it in an almost metaphysical way,
the burden of illiteracy became quite clear
. When the written word took on a
life of its own, as often happened, the "worth" of liberty was considerably
diminished for the unlettered person
. The metaphor of incarceration was
appropriate when in the absence of mutual understanding and a clear recogni-
tion of obligations incurred, the word became binding . In an ironic twist,
the written word, so often adulated as the architect of imagination and
freedom, became the instrument of misunderstanding, conflict, and bondage
.
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